conquests, but the dominant ideology continued to exert force throughout the Hellenistic period under the successor kingdoms. Nor was it limited to Greece. Rather, it underlay Cicero's appeals for political action in the prologue to On Republic and in the first book of On Duties.
And it remained a force at the end: Augustine wrote City of God to defend the Christians from the charge that their withdrawal from public affairs left Rome vulnerable to the barbarians.
But the dominant ideology did not go unopposed. In this chapter, I show how defenders of the quiet life challenged the view that ordinary political engagement should be central to the lives of citizens. To find these challenges, I concentrate chiefly on philosophical writings.
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Greek and Roman philosophers engaged in a long-standing dispute about whether it was best to live as an active citizen or as a detached philosopher, and this debate offers a rich source of reasons to resist the dominant ideology. I focus on three distinct challenges, with the aim of taking the measure of their significance for ancient political thought.
Three Defenses of Withdrawal
Although I will focus on philosophical writing, I begin with Euripides' Antiope because this play raises all three challenges and reminds us of the intellectual connections between authors that modern academe too often keeps apart. Only fragments of Antiope survive, but they record an interesting disagreement between two brothers. Zethus accuses Amphion of betraying his "noble nature (gennaian phusin)" by taking on a "womanish shape" and refusing to "offer vigorous counsel" (fr. 185 TGF). He charges, Any man well-equipped for life who neglects the affairs of his house and runs after the pleasures of music and dance will be useless (argos) to his house and the city and a nobody to his friends. One's nature (phusis) is ruined when one gives way to sweet pleasure. (fr. 187 TGF) Zethus also singles out for scorn the pleasures of intellectual inquiry, and he beseeches Amphion to reject "these refined subtleties" and "idle babbling" that threaten his house and weaken his city (frr. 188 and 219 TGF).
But Amphion can offer three distinct replies. First, he can defend his quiet pursuit of pleasure. This involves two distinct moves. Amphion first has to defend the pursuit of pleasure in general. He argues that uncertainties governing other pursuits make it a reasonable option (cf.
Horace, Odes 1.11):
Such is the life of struggling mortals: not always fortunate or unfortunate; sometimes successful and sometimes not. Since we are faced with uncertain blessedness, why should we not live as pleasantly as we can and avoid pain? (fr. 196 TGF) Amphion's second move is to insist that the best route to pleasure leads not through politics but through quiet withdrawal. He says, "He who busies himself in many things (prassei polla) that he might avoid is a fool, when he might live pleasantly as an unbusied man (apragmōna)" (fr.
193 TGF). The two steps of this argument are related. In a life of public engagement, one struggles against rivals to secure honor, prosperity, and security for oneself and one's friends.
But the goals of such competition are subject to fortune. Amphion argues that it is more sensible to pursue a goal that one can achieve reliably and that one can achieve one's goal reliably if one pursues pleasure in a quiet life.
Amphion can also defend the life of quiet withdrawal by defending more particularly the intellectual inquiries that Zethus scorns. Another fragment that might belong to Antiope suggests 5 how he could do this. This complicated fragment contrasts the life spent studying nature with sordid business:
Blessed is he who gives his attention to research, desiring neither the misery of his fellow-citizens nor unjust actions, but contemplating the ageless order of immortal nature-how it is constituted, and whence, and why. Concern for shameful deeds never sits near such things. (fr. 910 TGF) 4 Again, Amphion draws attention to the competition that political life involves. Such competition involves wishing ill to one's rivals and temptations to do wrong to promote one's own projects.
So even when things work out fortunately, politics is a disagreeable way of procuring what one wants. Quiet study, by contrast, is entirely free of such nastiness. It is not a disagreeable way of procuring what one wants; it is something that one wants. Quiet study simply makes one blessed because it is, if not valuable for its own sake, at least intrinsically pleasant. (If it is intrinsically pleasant, it brings about pleasure all by itself, and pleasure, according to Amphion, is valuable for its own sake.) Third, and perhaps most surprisingly, Amphion can argue that his detached life makes him a more effective citizen. Again, his argument has more than one part. His general claim is that wise advice takes precedence over manly vigor:
With a man's sound advice a city and a house thrive, and there is, in addition, great strength for war. For one bit of wise counsel conquers many hands, and ignorance is the greatest evil with the mob. (fr. 200 TGF)
Then Amphion suggests that he will be a more effective source of wise advice:
I hope I shall have a sense of proportion (aidōs) and say something wise, and so make no disturbance which harms the city. (fr. 202 TGF) It is not difficult to imagine that Amphion rests this hope on his quiet way of life. As we have seen, he expects that busily engaged citizens will show "concern for shameful deeds." So that kind of life threatens a "sense of proportion." Presumably, then, if Amphion thinks that he will have a "sense of proportion" and so be able to give wise advice, it is because his quiet life enables him to protect his balanced sense of right and wrong. So understood, Amphion connects the quiet life and wise citizenship.
It is perhaps surprising to see someone hold that one can mind one's own business and engage in politics. But if being unbusied (apragmosunē) is generally opposed to being nasty and meddlesome (polupragmosunē), and if there is no word for the condition of engaging in others' business without nasty meddling, then one might want to characterize the middle ground as a way of being unbusied or minding one's own business. That appears to be how Amphion sees himself. He does not entirely abandon politics, but nonetheless withdraws from the hustle and bustle of political competition in favor of research and pleasure. All told, then, he prefers the (relatively) quiet life for pleasure, intellectual inquiry, and wiser politics.
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It is not clear how Amphion would fit these aims together and balance his pursuit of pleasure, research, and the good of the city, nor is it clear how much political action or what kind of political action he would allow himself as one who minds his own business. Perhaps his position would display more obvious coherence if we had the rest of Euripides' play. Perhaps not: he is a character in a drama and not a theorist striving for consistency.
In any case, later philosophers who were eager to justify withdrawal from ordinary politics typically separated these aims. They independently prioritized just one of the three aims to argue that it would be better to live a quiet than a political life. The significance of their arguments lies not just in their ramifications for ancient ethical theory and its account of how a person should live. The philosophers who argue for withdrawal also challenge the dominant ideology about politics in different ways, and they all suggest an alternative conception of politics.
To offer a first approximation of how they do this, I need to tease out some of the dominant ideology's implicit commitments. The ideology explicitly holds that human excellence requires political action. If the ideology assumes, with Aristotle and many Greeks, that human excellence is the fulfillment of human nature, then it is committed to the idea that human beings are naturally political animals (see also Depew, this volume). But two other commitments offer a more relevant explanation of the dominant ideology. First, according to the dominant ideology, the good of a human's life is (at least primarily) not private and exclusive to him but shared or common; it is (at least primarily) located not in some state of himself but in activities that necessarily involve others. Second, the dominant ideology identifies these activities that necessarily involve others and (at least partly) constitute the good of a human life as the traditional activities of the active citizen. These two commitments explain why the dominant ideology holds that excellence and achieving the good so obviously require political engagement.
The three philosophical defenses of withdrawal challenge different features of the ideology and suggest different alternatives. The first, developed by Plato and Aristotle on behalf of philosophical contemplation, accepts both of the dominant ideology's implicit commitments but argues that some exceptional human beings do better by trying to transcend human nature and ordinary political activity. Like Amphion, they favor quiet study. Perhaps unlike Amphion, they think that only an exceptional few should favor quiet study, and they favor quiet study for its own sake, as the best activity a human can perform, and not for the sake of pleasure, although it is extremely pleasant. To the extent that Plato and Aristotle, and especially some heirs of their argument, suggest a community of like-minded people who avoid traditional political activity, they also introduce an alternative vision of a political community, and one that does not require face-to-face interaction.
The second defense of withdrawal, developed by Epicurus on behalf of pleasure, rejects the dominant ideology's first implicit commitment by arguing that the good for human beings is private-each person's good is his own pleasure and not a shared activity-and concludes that humans best realize their good outside traditional political activity. By turning their backs on the hazards of competition and embracing pleasure, including a defense of some intellectual inquiry, the Epicureans follow Amphion closely, although their concomitant embrace of a separatist community of Epicureans might well differ from his, which is uncertain. 
Withdrawal to Transcend Politics
Plato and Aristotle do not reject the dominant ideology, but their attraction to the ideal of minding one's own business leads them to plead for exceptions. They are in a difficult spot, wanting to motivate the ideal of minding one's own business without rejecting the dominant ideology. At first glance, it might seem that Plato succeeds in doing this by transforming what it means to mind one's own business. But in the end, the transformation is not enough. Plato is still drawn to the ideal of minding one's own business as traditionally understood, as the quiet life. He and Aristotle both argue that an elite few can live the best possible human life by withdrawing from politics, and their case for this introduces tension into their ethics and puts pressure on the dominant ideology.
Plato transforms the idea of minding one's own business in the Republic when he makes "minding one's own business" essential to justice, the paradigmatic excellence of the political life.
6 He maintains that the just person is one in whose soul each part minds its own business (Resp. 441d-e, 443c-d), and a just city is one in which each class of citizens minds its own business (Resp. 434c). This is a transformation because "minding one's own business" now has little to do with avoiding the business of the polis. Indeed, on Plato's scheme, the ruling class of the ideal city "minds its own business" (that is, it does its own job) by ruling the city! So it would appear that this transformation allows Plato to stand by the dominant ideology's rejection of withdrawal while co-opting the quiet life's ideal of "minding one's own business."
But his support for the dominant ideology is uneasy, for two reasons. First, Plato's transformed ideal of "minding one's own business" is highly restrictive. On his view, the just soul is ruled by its rational part (Resp. 441e), which must have knowledge (441e with 442c), and knowledge requires grasping the Forms, the non-sensible properties that explain the way things seem (Resp. 476a-479e with Books VI and VII). But only philosophers grasp the Forms (Resp.
476a-479e), and so only philosophers are, strictly speaking, just. On Plato's view, too, the just city is ruled by its rational part, which must have knowledge. So the just city must be ruled by philosophers (Resp. 473c-e). According to these standards, very few people and even fewer cities are just.
What is more, Plato holds that those who are just and who perfectly manifest the transformed ideal of "minding their own business"-that is, the philosophers-also want to mind their own business in the traditional sense of withdrawing from politics. 7 According to the Republic, a philosopher who has grasped the knowable reality that underlies and explains the world of perceptual experience wants nothing so much as to continue to contemplate this reality, and so she disdains politics. That is why, in the Republic, the founders of the ideal city have to compel the philosophers to rule (see Brown 2000 and 2004) . These philosophers will "mind their own business" in the transformed sense and engage in politics only if they are compelled to, and those who willingly engage in politics must, according to Plato, fail to "mind their own business" in the transformed sense. So it would seem that the transformation of "minding one's own business" fails to save Plato's attachment to the dominant ideology.
In fact, Plato expounds upon the gulf between the best, philosophical life and political activity in several dialogues. When the Republic addresses how philosophers should live in ordinary cities, it is clear that they should and will justifiably indulge their love for wisdom, far from politics (520a-b; cf. 496c-497a and 592a). In the Phaedo, Socrates insists that philosophers are completely different from anyone else, including regular citizens, for the philosophers are lovers of wisdom while everyone else is a lover of body (68b-c). And in his digression in the Theaetetus, he asserts that these utterly different interests involve incompatible skills:
philosophers are ignorant and unable in law-courts and political proceedings (173c-d) while politicians are ignorant and unable when it comes to philosophical discussions of justice (175b-d). In these works, Plato urges withdrawing from politics to live the best life a human being can live, the life of contemplative philosophy.
Plato's ideal of the quiet life of contemplation is not exactly Amphion's. Amphion defends intellectual activity in part because it brings him maximal pleasure and in part because it will enable him to give political advice. Plato's contemplators are not interested in giving political advice, and while they believe that contemplation is the most pleasant activity, pleasure is not their reason for contemplating. They are attracted to contemplative activity for its own sake, on account of their love of wisdom. 
Withdrawal to Reject Politics
Epicurus also demotes the value of political activity. He believes that politics has merely instrumental value, because he thinks that everything besides pleasure has value if and only if it brings about pleasure. This private conception of the good-each person should pursue his or her own pleasure-departs radically from the dominant ideology's conception of the good. But
Epicurus' understanding of pleasure is unusual, and although he generally favors the quiet life, he also lays the groundwork for a counter-cultural conception of politics.
Epicurus understands pleasure to be not sensual satisfaction but the absence of mental disturbance and physical pain. Thus, he proposes that success in life requires cultivating bulwarks against disturbance and pain and avoiding circumstances that are likely to give rise to disturbance and pain. These two strategies might be thought to pull in two different directions.
After all, the better one is equipped to shrug off what would pain most people, the less one needs avoidance, and the more one avoids pains, the less practice one has absorbing troublesome circumstances without trouble. But generally speaking, Epicurus prefers the odds of avoidance, and so he counsels against the political life (Sent. proposes an ideal political arrangement that embarrasses Plato's Republic by its impracticality.
The ideal, Zeno suggests, would obtain were every adult human being a Stoic sage. Any powersharing arrangement among non-sages is doomed to faction: political peace requires likemindedness (homonoia) which requires genuine wisdom. So on Zeno's radically deinstitutionalized picture of ideal politics, a community of sages can be counted on to be friends and to educate the young to be virtuous adults. They will need no law-courts or temples. Nor will they need a military, so long as the world is filled with cities each of which is filled exclusively with sages, sharing the same, Stoic way of life.
It is hard to see how such an ideal could have any practical import, since the Stoic sage is "rarer than the Phoenix." But Zeno insisted on the relevance of his Republic right from its start 
Withdrawal to Transform Politics
The third defense of withdrawing from politics accepts wholeheartedly the dominant ideology's claim that the good for a human being is activity that must be shared with other human beings, but it rejects the thought that this activity can be found in ordinary politics. Its sponsor is Socrates, at least as he appears in Plato's Socratic dialogues.
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Socrates uses paradox to characterize his attitude toward the political life: "It might perhaps seem strange that I go around giving advice and minding others' business privately but do not dare to go into your assembly and advise the city publicly" (Pl., Ap. 31c4-7). This is paradoxical because Socrates considers himself both a busybody (polupragmōn) and yet outside traditional politics. But he fully explains the paradox.
On the one hand, Socrates explains his rejection of traditional politics. He acknowledges that he gave Athens conventional political service on each of the three or four occasions when his city called upon him: he fought in battles at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium (Pl., Ap. 28de; cf. La. 181b); he was at least once-but not more than twice ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 62.3)-a member of the Council of Five Hundred (Pl., Ap. 32b1); and when the Thirty summoned Socrates to carry out an order, he answered the call, though he refused to carry out the order (Pl., Ap. 32c4-d7).
But the divine voice has told him to keep away from engaging in politics (Pl., Ap. 31d2-5), and
Socrates believes that it is entirely right to do so (Pl., Ap. 31d5-6). He explains, For know well, men of Athens, that if I had long ago tried to engage in political affairs, I
would have long ago perished and would have benefited neither you nor myself. Do not 20 be angry with me when I speak the truth, for no one at all will survive if he genuinely opposes either you or any other assembly and prevents many injustices and illegalities from occurring in the city. Rather, anyone who really fights on behalf of the just, if he is going to survive for even a short time, must live privately, and not publicly. (Pl., Ap.
31d6-32a3)
In order to benefit himself and the Athenians, Socrates believes that he had to withdraw from the traditional political life. So Socrates lived a philosophical life that "minds its own business" (cf.
Pl., Grg. 526c).
Yet, on the other hand, Socrates did not live a life of quiet contemplation (cf. Pl., Ap.
36b), and he did not withdraw from the business of helping the general public, for he believed that his examinations provide the greatest benefit to Athens that anyone could provide (Pl., Ap.
36c). This explains why he also characterizes himself as a "busybody" (Pl., Ap. 31c, quoted above), and it explains why he insists, in Plato's Gorgias, that he is the only Athenian of his time even to try to engage in true politics, which is to say, he is the only one who tries to improve others' lives instead of trying merely to make them feel better (521d).
Socrates, then, is a special case, and his argument for withdrawing from ordinary politics
depends upon rethinking what politics should be. He rejects thoroughly the values of contemporary Athenians, their love of honor and wealth (Pl., Ap. 36b et passim), and he argues instead that no one should engage in the affairs of the city before straightening out the affairs of his own soul (cf. Pl., Symp. 216a). Socrates in a way inherits a traditional aristocratic rejection of democratic politics. Rome, would have to be tamer (see Billerbeck 1996) .
Contesting the Political
Philosophers in antiquity sought to justify the quiet life against the dominant ideology's insistence that excellence requires engaging in the affairs of the polis in the assembly and the courts. It is not hard to find in these arguments an appearance of rationalization or selfjustification. But I have tried to show why it would be a mistake to dismiss these arguments or set them apart from "Greek and Roman political thought." By these arguments, the philosophers raise, sometimes merely implicitly and sometimes explicitly, deep and important questions about politics. Some of them merely challenge the values and virtues of the political agents around them. More searchingly, some of them go one step further, and offer a model of political activity that is not confined by the geography and institutions of the polis. When we are asking about what politics is, who does or should engage in politics, and how they should do so, these challenges matter.
FURTHER READING
The best study of Greek withdrawal from politics is Carter 1986, which covers the last third of the fifth century as the background to Plato's defense of the contemplative life. There are other senses of "minding one's own business" that I leave aside in this chapter.
Consider how Pericles attacks those who "mind their own business" in his final speech in Thucydides' history (2.63.2-3). Here those who "mind their own business" are attempting to persuade their fellow Athenians to surrender their empire (see also 2.64.1 for the attempt to persuade and the 2.64.4 for the opposition to empire). So they are not entirely minding their own business. Perhaps, then, "minding one's own business" is a relative term, always understood by contrast to some state of "busybody-ness" or "meddlesomeness" On the other hand, and perhaps more likely, Pericles might identify the anti-imperialists as "minding their own business" not because they are less meddlesome but because they want
Athens to "mind its own business" and surrender its empire. (Thucydides has the Corcyraean envoys say that Corcyra was formerly committed to minding its own business (apragmosunē) (1.32.5). Compare Arist., Pol. 7.2-3.) It is doubtful that the anti-imperialists themselves would embrace this label, since it smears them with political inexperience and inattention, but "minding one's own business" and "meddlesomeness" were often slogans in debates over Athenian foreign policy (see Ehrenberg 1953 and Kleve 1964) . I set this usage
